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Waterproofing the New Fracking Regulation: The Necessity of
Defining Riparian Rights in Louisiana's Water Law
Water, taken in moderation,cannot hurt anybody.
-Mark Twain
I. MAKING WAVES: THE

HAYNESVILLE SHALE DISCOVERY AND
ACT 955

It was not very romantic: There was no panning, no sifting
through gravel of cold streambeds for gold flecks. There were no
make-shift tents propped up on the sun-baked ground, no whistling
steam engines, braying horses, or ringing of pickaxes against
mountains. But in 2008, the atmosphere in North Louisiana must
have been thick with a similar excitement. When Chesapeake
Energy Corporation announced the discovery of an immense
natural gas deposit, now known as "the Haynesville Shale,"'
Louisiana's Mineral Board Secretary described the discovery's
impact on the state as "something akin to a modem day gold
rush." 2 In place of pans, tents, and pickaxes came trucks, wells,
and a flurry of property leases as energy companies rushed to
capitalize on the shale. The venture made some Louisiana
landowners millionaires overnight.4 Initial conservative estimates
suggested that the Haynesville Shale may hold up to 200 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, equivalent to 18 years' worth of current
oil production in the United States.5 Other industry executives
speculated that the deposit could be several times that size.6

Copyright 2011, by LAURA SPRINGER.

1. The Haynesville Shale is an Upper Jurassic-age shale underlying much
of the Gulf Coast. Most natural gas production from the Haynesville Shale has
taken place in Caddo, Bienville, Bossier, DeSoto, Red River and Webster
Parishes. Haynesville Shale Orientation, http://geology.com/articles/haynesvilleshale.shtml (last visited March 6, 2011).
2. LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., Mineral Lease Sale Over the Top-$35 Million
for June, June 12, 2008, available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfi?md=
newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=487.
3. Don Briggs, president of the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association, called
the leasing rush "historic": "We've never seen anything like it in the United
States. Companies were paying $10,000 to $30,000 an acre. There was $4
billion thrown into leases over the last year." Experts Say Emerging Haynesville
Shale Play Has Vast Potential, 16 BASIN OIL & GAs, Apr. 2009, http://www.
fwbog.com/index.php?page=article&article=102.
4. Ben Casselman, US. Gas Fields Go from Bust to Boom, WALL ST. J.,
April 30, 2009, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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As industry responded to the Haynesville Shale, so did the
Legislature. On July 2, 2010, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
signed Act 955 of the 2010 Legislative Regular Session into law.7
The Act grants the secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources authority to enter into "cooperative endeavor
agreements" for the withdrawal of running surface water of the
state. In a cooperative endeavor agreement, the secretary reviews
applications for water withdrawal and, if an application is
approved, collects "fair market value" for the water withdrawn.8
The Act specifically exempts a certain class of landowners
from its purview: Act 955 has no effect on "any rights held by
riparian owners in accordance with the laws of this state."' The
"laws of this state" are ambiguous, however, and the Legislature
does not otherwise specify which riparian rights Act 955 will
respect. Consequently, riparian landowners and oil and gas
companies might be uncertain of their legal rights, and therefore
may circumvent the Department of Natural Resources' mandate by
conducting independent withdrawals pursuant to leases or other
arrangements.
Water fuels natural gas extraction; thus, considerations of how
and by whom water may be withdrawn are crucial for those
involved in the Haynesville Shale venture. This Comment explores
the extent of riparian rights in Louisiana, particularly whether
riparian rights encompass the use of running surface water for
hydraulic fracturing ("fracking," in industry vernacular). First, this
Comment addresses whether Louisiana law recognizes a riparian
right to withdraw running surface water for the purpose of
fracking, the industry practice that Act 955 intends to regulate.' 0
Second, assuming that Louisiana law does recognize this riparian
right of use, this Comment explores whether riparians may convey
that right to non-riparian oil and gas companies. A general
evaluation of riparian rights suggests that fracking is a permissible
riparian use of water. Such evaluation further suggests that this
7. Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315. Act 955 is presently codified as LA.
REv. STAT. § 30:961-63. These statutory provisions are interim provisions,
intended to be null after December 31, 2012. Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315,
3319. Though the Act is interim legislation, it is the precursor to the
establishment of "permanent state policy." Id. It is prudent to discuss the
implications of Act 955 now, with a view towards defining future state policy.
8. Id. at 3316.
9. Id. A riparian is a landowner whose land borders a body of water.
DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW INA NUTSHELL 16 (4th ed. 2009).
10. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., Act 955-Surface Water
Resources Management, Sept. 2010, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=
pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=92 (select "Overview Presentation,Sept. 2010').
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right of use does not extend to non-riparians, nor is this right
capable of being leased or sold. To maximize Act 955's
effectiveness, however, the Legislature should expressly state that
there is no riparian right to convey water to a non-riparian for
fracking. The Legislature must name its target; otherwise, Act 955
shoots and misses.
II. WHY REGULATE? HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Because of its extensive water use, fracking implicates two
state constitutional provisions that seem to support Act 955's
regulatory scheme. First, the Public Trust doctrine requires the
Legislature to enact laws to protect Louisiana's natural resources,
including water." Second, because water is a public thing, it may
not be donated by the State.12 Act 955 is premised on the notion
that if the State allows withdrawal of large amounts of running
water for fracking, the result is an unconstitutional, tacit State
donation of a public thing.' 3
A. The FrackingProcess
Fracking in the Haynesville Shale was the catalyst for Act
955." Fracking is a process that increases output from natural gas
wells.' 5 The fracking process involves a high-pressured injection
of large amounts of fluid into a geologic formation.' 6 The fluid is
primarily water, with some trace chemical additives." The
pressure from the fluid creates or expands existing fractures in the
underground rock.' 8 As the rock fractures, a "propping agent" such
11. LA. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
12. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 14.
13. See La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0176 (2010). Discussing the methods by
which entities have removed water for fracking, the Attorney General explained
that running water "cannot be donated by allowing a person with a tanker truck
to pump it out of the creek from a public road right-of-way." Id. at 4.
14. LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 2, at slides 2-6.
15. OFFICE OF RES. AND DEV., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA 600/F-10/002, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH
STUDY 1 (June 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hf
researchstudyfs.pdf [hereinafter "EPA STUDY"].
16. Id.
17. A spokesperson for Halliburton, for instance, states that chemical
additives "typically comprise less than one-half of 1 percent of [its] hydraulic
fracturing solutions." Tom Zeller, Jr., E.P.A. to Study Chemicals Used to Tap
Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at B3.
18. EPA STUDY, supra note 15, at 1.
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as sand is pumped underground to keep the fractures open.19
Natural gas flows from the fractures into the well, where it is then
extracted.2 0
Fracking has become increasinily important in unlocking
previously unreachable gas reserves. 1 Of the 450,000 operating
gas wells in the United States, 90% rely on fracking for
production.22 This reliance on fracking is a concomitant reliance on
water: fracking a single well may require millions of gallons of
water. 23 The Louisiana Ground Water Resources Program reported
that from October 2009 to mid-July 2010, 80% of the water used
for drilling operations in the Haynesville Shale came from surface
water sources. 24 In that 10-month span, 1.5 billion gallons of
surface water were used.25
B. ConstitutionalConcerns with Fracking:Public Trust Doctrine
and Donation ofPublic Things
The sheer volume of water at issue buttresses the logic behind
regulation. But regulating the withdrawal of running surface water
may be more than ostensibly sensible; it may be mandatory under
at least two provisions of the Louisiana Constitution.
First, the need for regulation finds support in the Constitution's
mandate to protect state natural resources. The running waters of
the state are a public thing, held in the public trust.26 Article IX,
section 1, known as "The Natural Resources Article," declares that
"[t]he natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of
the people." 27 Furthermore, the Article states that "[t]he legislature
shall enact laws to implement this policy." 28 This provision
19. Id
20. Id.
21. Tom Zeller, Jr., E.P.A. Considers Risks of Gas Extraction, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2010, at Bl.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., Ground Water Resources Commission
Updated on Water Use, Aug. 19, 2010, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfn?md=
newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=11.
25. Id.
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2009) ("Public things are owned by the state or
its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons. Public things that
belong to the state are such as running waters. . . ."); LA. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
27. LA. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
2 8. Id.
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establishes a "public trust" doctrine, mandating an affirmative duty
on the part of the State to protect public resources. The Louisiana
Supreme Court explained that the Natural Resources Article
"imposes a duty of environmental protection on all state agencies
and officials, establishes a standard of environmental protection,
and mandates the legislature to enact laws to implement fully this
29
policy."
If fracking implicates environmental protection concerns, then
it also implicates the Public Trust doctrine. Critics of the fracking
process suggest it poses environmental risks. Presently, fracking is
the subject of pending contamination lawsuits, 30 a New York
moratorium, 3 1 and an ongoing EPA study of fracking's
environmental impact.32 Other concerns about the safety of
fracking include the design and soundness of well casings,
potential chemical spills, and the ecological impact of removing
millions of gallons of water from local water bodies. 33 Any real or
perceived environmental risks associated with fracking are largely
beyond the scope of this Comment. The very existence of the
debate, however, does implicate the Public Trust doctrine, and may
inform the question of "reasonable use," which is discussed
below.3 4
Additionally, the constitutional prohibition of the State's
donation of a public thing supports the regulation of the
withdrawal of running surface water. The Louisiana Civil Code
classifies the running water of the State as a public thing owned by
the State in its capacit as a public person.3 5 The State may not
donate a public thing.3 Because running water is a public thing,
the Attorney General has opined that allowing industries to pump
public water for its private interests is an impermissible donation.
29. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1156 (La. 1984).
30. More than a dozen Pennsylvania families filed suit alleging that
combustible gases, chemicals, and industrial wastes from fracking operations
contaminated their drinking water and made them ill. Tom Zeller, Jr., New
Lawsuit Filed in FrackingCountry, GREEN (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:33 A.M.), http://
green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/new-lawsuit-filed-in-fracking-country/.
3 1. Id.
32. Zeller, supra note 17. The EPA aims to publish the results of its study
by the end of 2012. Id.
33. Zeller, supra note 21.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2009).
36. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 14.
37. La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0176, 4 (2010) (running water "cannot be
donated by allowing a person with a tanker truck to pump it out of the creek
from a public road right-of-way").
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When an oil and gas company appropriates millions of gallons of
the public's running water, the withdrawal must come with a price
tag to avoid being an unconstitutional donation. Although the
legislature may not donate a public thing, it may sell a public thing
pursuant to statutory authorization, and Act 955 authorizes the
State to sell running water.38

III. NAVIGATING THE RIPARIAN RIGHTS EXCEPTION
Regardless of whether fracking is dangerous, harmless, or
beneficial to the public, the real question is whether Act 955, as
written, will lead to any cooperative endeavor agreements at all.
One provision of the Act is particularly problematic for
deciphering when cooperative endeavor agreements are necessary.
The Act states that its provisions "shall have no effect on the rights
provided for in Civil Code Articles 657 and 658 or any rights held
by riparian owners in accordance with the laws of this state." 39
Riparians are exempt from the obligation to obtain cooperative
endeavor agreements to withdraw surface water, at least insofar as
that requirement contravenes "rights held by riparian owners in
accordance with the laws of this state." However, the "laws of this
state" concerning riparian rights are ambiguous.
Unresolved questions pertinent to the implementation of Act
955 include what "uses" a riparian is permitted to make of water,
and whether and to what extent those uses may be consumptive or
polluting. Also at issue is how far geographically the riparian may
exercise his or her right of use, and whether riparian rights are, like
other property rights, capable of transfer or severance from the
land. If riparians or those in the fracking industry can circumvent
the cooperative endeavor agreement requirement under the mantle
of exercising "riparian rights," then Act 955 may be futile.
These questions are complicated by a sister piece of legislation,
Act 994, which reconfigures the definition of riparian rights by
carving an immense industry-based exception to Act 955.4 Under
Act 994, water withdrawn for agricultural purposes is exempt from
the requirement to enter into a cooperative endeavor agreement,
38. Id.; cf New Orleans v. Dupuy Storage & Forwarding Corp., 41 So. 2d
721 (La. 1949).
39. Act. No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315, 3316.
40. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, LA. DEP'T OF NAT. REs., Act 955-Surface Water
Resources Management, Sept. 2010, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=
pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=92 (select "Overview Presentation,Sept. 2010, "
slide 8). Riparian owners and agricultural users are the two groups who are "not
part of the law." Id.
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and therefore free from Act 955's government-imposed fees.4 '
Whether Act 994 clarifies the extent of riparian rights or only
further muddies the water depends on Act 994's construction in
conjunction with existing Louisiana law. Either way, any
discussion of riparian rights must now address the implications of
Act 994's agricultural exception.
Act 955 expresses the legislative intent that it will "provide
needed interim stewardship of running surface water . ... so that a

thorough, deliberate, public, legislative evaluation of the issues and
concerns ma be had before a permanent state policy is
established." AEvaluating riparian rights is a necessary first step to
determining a permanent state water policy. Interested parties need
clarity and predictability to understand their rights and comply
with the law, and the public needs security in the stewardship of its
natural resources. 43
A. The RiparianRights Doctrine
Louisiana's water law is based on. the doctrine of riparian
rights.4 A riparian is a landowner whose land borders a
waterbody.4 5 This proximity to water gives landowners rights
relating to the use of water, called "riparian rights."46 In riparian
jurisdictions, a riparian's right to use water on his or her land is
41. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3335.
42. Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315, 3319.
43. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is feasible that a situation
could arise in which a riparian could demonstrate that the State's issuance of a
permit to a non-riparian, pursuant to a cooperative endeavor agreement, has
materially interfered with the riparian's rights of use. In such a situation, the
State may be obligated to compensate the riparian for a "taking" of the riparian's
rights. Cf, McCook Irrigation & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 102 N.W. 249
(Neb. 1905). When an act authorized appropriation of state waters for irrigation,
a riparian owner whose property rights were appropriated or impaired was
entitled to compensation for injuries actually sustained. The Nebraska Supreme
Court explained: "[I]t is the intent of the law that the private [riparian] right shall
be subordinated, and, when required for public use, taken under the law of
eminent domain, and for which the owner of the riparian estate whose property
is taken or injured is entitled to due compensation." Id. at 250-51. See also
Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R.R. Co., 44 N.W. 1144, 1146 (Minn. 1889) (the
"right of the riparian . . . is a property right, vested in him, recognized and

protected in the law as property. He cannot be deprived of it without due process
of law. It cannot be taken from him, and devoted to public use, without
compensation.").
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 657 (2009) ("The owner of an estate bordering on
running water may use it as it runs for the purpose of watering his estate or for
other purposes.").
45. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 16.
46. Doiron v. O'Bryan, 51 So. 2d 628 (La. 1951).
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generally treated as a vested property right.4 7 The Louisiana
Supreme Court has affirmed this treatment of riparian rights,
noting that "[t]he courts are not always explicit about it; but
impliedly, if not expressly, they recognize ... riparian rights . . . as
forms of property."
Louisiana operates under a riparian regime and acknowledges
that appertaining rights are a form of property. Beyond those basic
principles, Louisiana's drought of water rights jurisprudence
makes it difficult to say with certainty what riparian rights mean in
the state. Riparian rights in Louisiana have been described "so
vaguely and contain so many gaps that the rights of landowners,
nonriparians, and 'the state' with regard to withdrawing or using
surface water-or restricting such use-are neither clearly
delineated nor adequately protected by law.'A 9 Because the new
law implicates riparian rights, determining what riparian rights are
is essential to coherently interpreting the legislation. Defining
riparian rights in the context of Act 955 will affect statutory
interpretation, understandings of parties' rights, and the efficacy of
the legislation.
Exploring the history and interpretation of riparian rights in
other jurisdictions may assist in determining what Louisiana's
riparian rights encompass. The Louisiana Civil Code's two
ambiguous riparian rights articles have not been the subject of
comprehensive judicial interpretation; therefore, there is scarce
case law to provide guidance.50 Louisiana's own lack of
jurisprudence invites jurisdictional comparisons, especially
because the majority of American states follow the riparian
doctrine, or some variation thereof.5 ' Because American riparian
doctrine developed from civil law sources, American common law
and Louisiana Civil Code articles draw from the same doctrinal

47.
29 TUL.
48.
49.

Ewell P. Walther, Jr., Comment, Acquisition of the Right to Use Water,
L. REv. 554, 554-55 (1955).
State v. Chambers Inv. Co., Inc., 595 So. 2d 598, 602 (La. 1992).
LA. DEP'T OF TRANS. & DEV., THE LOUISIANA WATER RESOURCES
STUDY COMMISSION'S REPORT TO THE 1984 LEGISLATURE 32 (1984).
50. Walther, supra note 47, at 562 ("The fact that Louisiana has historically
had a sufficient water supply undoubtedly accounts for the dearth of
jurisprudence on water rights."); see also James M. Klebba, Water Rights and
Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez Faire Riparianism, Market Based
Approaches, or a New Managerialism?,53 LA. L. REv. 1779, 1791 (1993).
51. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 16 ("Twenty-nine states have systems rooted
in the riparian doctrine. Ten others have a system based on some combination of
riparian and prior appropriation doctrines.").
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spring.5 2 Thus, examination of civilian history is illuminating.
Furthermore, nothing in this state's jurisprudence suggests that
Louisiana would vary from common law jurisdictions in this
respect, so a comparison provides useful guidance.s3
1. RiparianDoctrinalHistory and the Development of the
Reasonable Use Doctrine
The doctrine of riparian rights is ancient, dating back to Roman
Law. The Emperor Justinian's 54 Institutes listed running water
among the "things that belong to all men," as res communes. 5 The
corpus of the water itself was therefore insusceptible of ownership,
and the Institutes provided that "the right to use water belonged
only to those who had access to the water by virtue of their
ownership of riparian land."5 6 In 1804, the Code Napoleon
codified the doctrine of riparian rights in modem continental
Europe. The Code Napoleon elucidated two core principles of
riparian rights: the limitation of water rights to riparian proprietors,
and the requirement that any water used must be returned to its
natural course.5 8
In the early 19th century, the writings of jurists James Kent and
Joseph Story introduced the concept of riparian rights into
American common law.59 Prior to Kent's and Story's treatment of
52. Id. at 16-17 (noting that some scholars diverge on whether the riparian
doctrine is a product of the civil law or the English common law; however,
riparian rights date back to Justinian's Institutes in the civil law tradition).
53. Walther, supranote 47; Klebba, supra note 50, at 1791.
54. Justinian reigned over the Byzantine Empire from 527 to 565 A.D. See
Sarah Brooks, "The Byzantine State under Justinian I (Justinian the Great),"
HERBRUNN TIMELINE OF ART HISTORY, (New York: The Metropolitan Museum
of Art, 2000), http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/just/hdjust.htm (originally
published October 2001, last revised April 2009).
55. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea." THE INSTITUTES
OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1. (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1853). Since the late 1800s,
Louisiana has enacted statutes asserting state ownership of things previously
classified as "common." The legislation secured administrative and financial
advantages to the State, but "resulted in the near elimination of the category of
common things." A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 46, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 87 (4th ed. 2001). However, "the reclassification brought into
line Louisiana law and modem continental doctrine and legislation. The 1978
revision, following this trend, has limited the category of common things to air
and the high seas." Id.
56. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 17.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 18.
59. Walther, supra note 47.
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the issue, the civil law appraised riparian rights under the theory of
"natural flow." 60 Under the natural flow theory, each riparian is
entitled to have water flow through his or her property in its
"natural quality." 61 This natural quality is subject only to small
alterations by the natural uses of upstream riparians. 62 These
natural uses are "usually restricted to diminutions essential for
domestic purposes," 63 such as drinking, washing, and watering
small gardens.6 4 Thus, riparian rights under the natural flow theory
were rather limited.
Present American conceptions of riparian rights be an with
Justice Story's 1827 opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson. Justice
Story's discussion of riparian rights introduced the doctrine of
"reasonable use" into American law. 66 Essentially, a riparian is
entitled to use water flowing over his land for any purpose, as long
as his use is reasonable. The question of reasonableness hinges
upon whether a particular use operates to the detriment of other

riparians.6 7

This decisive articulation of the "reasonable use" doctrine of
riparian rights sprang from a dispute between riparian mill owners
and defendants whose upstream dam diverted water from the
plaintiffs' mills. 68 Justice Story acknowledged the natural flow
theory of riparian rights, explaining that by virtue of his or her
riparian ownership, the landowner has "a right to the use of the
water flowing over [riparian land] in its natural current, without
diminution or obstruction., 69 Although the riparian has the right to
use the water's natural flow, "strictly speaking, he has no property
in the water itself."7 0 The riparian is entitled only to "a simple use
of it, while it passes along." 7 1 Justice Story then went beyond the
tenets of the natural flow theory, reasoning that "[t]he consequence
of [the natural flow] principle is, that no proprietor has a right to
60. Id. at 555.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 35. It is suggested elsewhere that the natural
flow theory also allows the riparian "to make artificial use of the water, so long
as he does not materially affect the natural flow of the stream through the
property of the downstream proprietor." See Jerry G. Jones, Comment, Water
Rights in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv. 500, 501 (1956).
65. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
66. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 21.
67. Id.
68. Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 472.
69. Id. at 474.
70.

Id.

71.

Id.
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use the water to the prejudice of another."72 Thus, water use is not
limited to the domestic, subsistence uses traditionally permitted
under the natural flow theory. 73 Justice Story acknowledged that
perfect apportionment of flowing waters between riparians is
impossible. Although riparian landowners have a "common right"
to the water that flows among them, Justice Story refused to hold
"that there can be no diminution whatsoever, and no obstruction or
impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in the use of the
water as it flows." 74 Some diminution or alteration of the water's
flow is an implied part of the right of using a stream.75 To construe
the riparian right otherwise "would be to deny any valuable use of
it. There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is
common to all, a reasonableuse."76
Justice Story shifted the inquiry from whether a particular use
comports with water's natural flow to whether a use is reasonable.
In so doing, Justice Story set forth a simple test for reasonableness:
does the use injure other riparian proprietors? If not, then "[t]here
may be a diminution in quantity, or a retardation or acceleration of
the natural current indispensable for the general and valuable use
of the water, perfectly consistent with the existence of the common
right."7 7 Justice Story noted that "[t]he law here, as in many other
cases, acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience and
general good."7 8
Less than one year after Justice Story's decision in Tyler v.
Wilkinson, James Kent embraced the reasonable use doctrine in his
Commentarieson American Law, specifically citing Justice Story's
opinion. 79 Like Justice Story, Kent affirmed the logic that because
"[s]treams of water are intended for the use and comfort of man,"
it would be "unreasonable, and contrary to the universal sense of
mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of
the water to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes,
provided the use of it be made under the limitations which have
been mentioned.',s
Through Kent's influence, the transformation of the riparian
doctrine from a theory of natural flow to reasonable use spread
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
1896).

Id. (emphasis added).
GETCHES, supra note 9, at 35.
Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
GETCHES, supra note 9, at 21.
3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 440 (14th ed.
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throughout the United States and surfaced across the Atlantic as
English courts adopted Kent's interpretation of riparian rights.8 1
Today, all riparian states employ some form of the reasonable use
doctrine.82 Reasonableness continues to be a holistic inquiry,
determined by the facts of the case, the utility of the use, and the
severity of the use's impact on other riparians. 3
2. Reasonable Use in Louisiana
The law is not explicit, but it is fairly clear that Louisiana
follows the reasonable use doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court
addressed a dispute between riparian owners in Long v. Louisiana
Creosoting Co. 4 The defendant operated a creosoting plant near a
creek that ran through the plaintiffs farm, over a mile downstream
from the plant.85 The plaintiff prevailed on his claim that the
defendant's use polluted the watercourse, and was awarded
damages.8 6 However, the trial court refused to grant the plaintiffs
request for an injunction against the defendant. The Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying that "[w]hether a use that
pollutes a water course is a reasonableor an unreasonable use is
for the udge or jury to determine from all the circumstances of a
case." The Court's recognition that reasonableness is a factual
inquiry echoes the principles of the reasonable use doctrine. The
facts of Long further suggest that Louisiana follows the reasonable
use doctrine instead of the natural flow theory. It is difficult to
imagine a permissible use under the natural flow theory capable of
polluting a waterway. However, by denying an injunction against
use that was found to pollute the water, the Long Court made clear
that even a polluting use may be permissible in certain situations.
In addition to case law, there is other support for the
proposition that Louisiana follows the reasonable use doctrine,
such as Civil Code article 657.The article provides that the "owner
of an estate bordering on running water may use it as it runs for the
81. Walther, supra note 47, at 555; GETCHES, supra note 9, at 19 (citing
Mason v. Hill, 110 E.R. 692 (Eng. 1833), as the case in which the writings of
Justice Story and Kent were incorporated into English riparian doctrine).
82. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 21. Although some courts continue to use
"natural flow" language when discussing riparian rights, generally, this language
actually refers to some variant of reasonable use. Id.
83. Jones, supra note 64, at 501.
84. 69 So. 281 (La. 1915).
85. Id. Creosote, made from coal tar, is primarily used as a wood
preservative.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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purpose of watering his estate or for other purposes."" The
inclusion of the phrase "for other purposes" would make the article
unnecessarily broad if the redactors intended to allow only basic
domestic uses under the natural flow rule. Finally, every other
riparian state follows some version of the reasonable use doctrine,
and there is nothing to indicate Louisiana would vary on this
point.8 9
B. Use and Consumption
Accepting that the riparian right is a right of reasonable use
that may necessitate diminution of the water body, the question
becomes whether "use" generally allows "taking" water, and to
what extent such consumptive use is reasonable. Even if one
assumes the use of water for fracking is a consumptive and
somewhat polluting use, those characteristics would probably not
remove water drawn for fracking from the pool of acceptable
riparian uses.
1. Reasonable Use Includes Consumptive Use
Scholars recognize that it is a "paradox" that every riparian has
a right to use the water abutting his land, "for how can all riparian
owners take and use all of the same finite quantity of water?" 90
Because all riparians cannot take and use the same finite quantity
of water, the "material injury" standard controls riparian
consumption. A riparian owner, "for the sake of the others, though
he may use and temporarily detain the water, has the duty not
substantially to diminish its quantity or level." 9'
Under the reasonable use doctrine, the general rule in riparian
jurisdictions is that a riparian's use may involve the removal of
water from the watercourse. 92 Riparians may always remove water
for natural uses, because policy dictates that uses necessary to
sustain life are inherently reasonable. 93 Additionally, lifesustaining natural uses are categorically reasonable because such
limited uses are unlikely to consume enough water to harm
88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 657 (2009).
89. Klebba, supra note 50, at 1791.
90. William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation of RiparianRights, A Species of
Taking Without Touching, 30 LA. L. REV. 394, 408 (1970).
91. Id. (citing Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARv. L. REV. 190
(1909), for "the classic discussion").
92. See GETCHES, supra note 9, at 35-39.
93. Id. at 36.
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downstream riparians. 94 In some jurisdictions, this reasonable use
preference for natural uses may mean that a riparian can make
natural uses of the water adjacent to his property regardless of the
consequences for downstream riparians. 9 Second, artificial uses of
water for irrigation and industrial purposes necessarily consume
water, but are simply subject to the test of reasonableness. 96
For more than a century, most riparian jurisdictions have found
that reasonable use encompasses the use of water for domestic,
agricultural, and manufacturing purposes, subject to the
qualification that the use may "not work a material injury to the
other proprietors." 97 The proposed use of the water however, may
be a consideration in determining reasonableness. 9 Depending on
the jurisdiction's policy preferences, some uses may be privileged
over others based on the uses' history and utility within the state.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 850A suggests the
following factors for evaluating the reasonableness of water use:
(a) the purpose of the use, (b) the suitability of the use to
the watercourse or lake, (c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use, (e) the extent and amount of
the harm it causes, (f) the practicality of avoiding the harm
by adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor or
the other, (g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of
water used by each proprietor, (h) the protection of existing
values of water uses, land, investments and enterprises and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the
loss. 99
Under the Restatement criteria, fracking may indeed be a
reasonable use of water. By all accounts, the economic and social
value associated with the use of water for fracking Haynesville
94. Id.at 35-36; see also Meng. v. Coffee, 93 N.W. 713, 717 (Neb. 1903)
(noting the distinction between "modes of use which ordinarily involve the
taking of small quantities and but little interference with the stream, such as
drinking and other household purposes, and those which necessarily involve the
taking or diversion of large quantities and a considerable interference with its
ordinary course and flow, such as manufacturing").
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id.
97. Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848); see, e.g., Meng, 93 N.W. at
717 (riparians must exercise rights of use with due regard for the rights of
others); Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955) (reasonable use is a
response to the "progress of civilization, particularly in regard to manufacturing,
irrigation, and recreation," and use of water is "limited to what is reasonable,
having due regard for the rights of others").
98. Walther, supra note 47, at 555-56.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
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Shale wells is very significant, even though the use is highly
consumptive.loo In assessing reasonableness, the benefits of
fracking may outweigh the costs.
2. Polluting Use May Still Be Reasonable
In riparian states with permit regimes similar to Act 955's
cooperative endeavor agreements, state authorities weigh pollution
as a factor in determining whether to issue permits for the taking of
water.10 Failure to consider pollution may violate the right of
riparians to receive the natural flow of water in a "reasonably pure
condition."' 02 Because the withdrawal of running surface water does
not immediately impact the quality of the running waters that
traverse riparian land, it is especially difficult to evaluate whether
fracking pollutes the environment. Complaints about fracking and
related activities concern primarily groundwater contamination.103
However, because groundwater is only one phase in the "vast
circulatory system known as the hydrologic cycle," water "may be
surface water one moment and ground water the next, and vice
versa. But it is all water, and it must be considered as a whole-each
phase in relation to the others and to the entire hydrologic cycle." 04
Thus, the condition and supply of groundwater are "intimately
connected to those of surface water."' 0 Almost every use of surface
water will "necessarily alte[r] the chemistry or temperature of a
stream or lake either because it discharges some waste back into the
stream or because the removal of water makes the stream less
capable of diluting other contaminants."1 06 As a result, all water uses
technically may be somewhat polluting. The Restatement factors
apply with equal force to the polluting use inquiry in the context of
fracking as with any other potentially polluting use: even assuming
fracking poses environmental risks, the benefits of fracking prevail
in the reasonableness calculus.
100. See LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, MineralLease Sale Over the Top$35 million for June, June 12, 2008, available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm?md= newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=487.
101. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 37.
102. Stoebuck, supra note 90, at 401 (citing 1 H. FARNHAM, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 285-90 n.20 (1904)); see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 55, §
57, at 104 ("[T]he user of running water should consider the rights of other
persons and refrain from pollution.").
103. See Zeller, supra note 30.
104. C.L. McGuinness, The Water Situation in the United States with Special
Reference to Ground Water, in U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR GEOLOGICAL

SURVEY 114, June 1951, at 3, 6.
105. Klebba, supra note 50, at 1819.
106. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 43.
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3. Consumptive andPolluting Uses in Louisiana
Louisiana law recognizes that water is a valuable commodity
of diverse value, naming uses for municipal, industrial,
agricultural, and domestic purposes as uses for which no charge
may be assessed against any person.' 0 7 The law does not qualify
this freedom of use with any requirement that such uses be neither
consumptive nor polluting.
a. Louisiana'sLiberal Water Use History
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1101 expresses a policy
of free water use for the general public. 0 8 This policy is an
important underlying consideration in determining whether
Louisiana riparian rights include uses that may be consumptive or
polluting. Water should be freely available to the public;
furthermore, the Civil Code privileges riparians over the general
public, granting them specific rights of water use.1 09 A fortiori,
riparians should be able to use water for section 9:1101's listed
purposes to an even more liberal extent than the general public.
Louisiana Civil Code article 657 declares that the owner of an
estate bordering on running water may use the running water as it
runs for the purpose of watering his estate or for other purposes." o
The meaning of the phrase "for other purposes" is ambiguous, as is
the amount of water the riparian may use."' However, the article
allows a riparian to water his estate, and irrigation requires large
amounts of water. 112 Civil Code article 657 suggests riparian rights
are broad, but it does not spell out an appropriate standard for
determining what constitutes a reasonable use. Outside of
Louisiana, the riparian rights doctrine is construed to suggest that
the appropriate measure of permissible water withdrawals is
whether the withdrawals cause material harm to other riparians.113
107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008). Obviously, Act 955 supersedes
section 9:1101's "no charge" position, but the policy is still clear: Louisiana
encourages a diversity of water uses.
108. Id.
109. LA. CIV. CODE art. 657 (2009).
110. Id.
111. Jones, supra note 64, at 507.
112. Landscape irrigation alone may waste up to 1.5 billion gallons of water
daily in the United States. WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, Landscape Irrigation, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/services/land
scape irrigation.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2010).
113. "[A]ll riparian proprietors, having equally the right of access, must
exercise the resulting usufruct reasonably, with due regard to the rights of their
neighbors on the stream." Wiel, supra note 91, at 208.
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But Louisiana's riparian rights, whatever they are, must be
newly evaluated in the context of Louisiana's new laws. Act 994,
codified at the same time as Act 955, exempts agricultural water
withdrawals from the requirement of cooperative endeavor
agreements." 4 Because Act 994 implicates riparian rights, it is
worthwhile to explore the Act's possible application in a debate
over whether water withdrawal for fracking is a riparian right of
use.
b. Filteringthe Debate:Act 994's Consumed/UsedDistinction
for Water Use and Its Implicationsfor ConstruingRiparian
Rights
Act 994 introduces a distinction between water that is
consumed and water that is merely used. Act 994 section 1(A)
"finds that waters used in agricultural or aquacultural pursuits are
not consumed, rather they are merely used.""' The distinction is
noteworthy, if arbitrarily reached. Act 994 performs philosophical
acrobatics to make its consumed/used distinction; in sum,
agricultural and aquacultural uses of water are "value-adding
processes" because they accelerate water's transit through the
hydrological cycle.1 6 According to Act 994, the "direct and
indirect effects that result from these uses bring a positive impact
on the resource and the environment that yields a value far in
excess of the value of the resource as mere running water."" 7 This
analysis resulted in Act 994's legislative finding that "there is no
prohibited donation by agricultural and aquacultural uses of these
sorts."' 18 Thus, a non-riparian may use water for agriculture or
aquaculture without paying for the water that it withdraws, and the
State will not classify this withdrawal as a "donation." "9 It is
unclear whether the Legislature arrived at its "no donation"
conclusion through the vehicle of "no consumption," through
"positive impact," or through some combination of both. In any
event, Louisiana has decided that riparian rights include the right
to grant a non-riparian access to withdraw running water for
agricultural or aquacultural purposes, free from state fees.120
114. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3535. An "agricultural or aquacultural purpose" means "any use
by a riparian owner or an assignee of a riparian owner of running surface waters
withdrawn and used for the purpose of directly sustaining life or providing
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The distinction between water that is consumed and water that
is merely used, however, must be conceptually separated from the
question of limits on riparian rights of use. The consumed/used
distinction is a channel for the Legislature to find that there is no
donation when water is used by a non-riparian for agriculture.
Thus, the consumed/used distinction implicates water use by nonriparians; it does not, however, propose that riparian rights are
limited to water uses of the "merely used" variety. The Legislature
wanted to give farmers the ability to take water free of charge. Act
994 accomplishes this by looking to those who already have the
right to use water free of charge-riparians-and then duplicating
that right by allowing riparians to extend their own rights to nonriparians for agricultural use.
Those favoring an anti-fracking statutory construction of Act
994 may argue there is no riparian right to use water for fracking
because fracking consumes water, rather than merely using it. One
may argue that because Act 994 enumerates two specific purposes
for which water is used instead of consumed,121 water use for any
purpose other than agriculture or aquaculture is impliedly not
"used," but rather consumed. However, this argument misreads
Act 994. The Act's distinction between whether water is consumed
or used addresses whether water is donated by the state when a
non-riparian takes it. Act 994 is not a restrictive definition of what
riparian rights of use are, because Act 955 expresses the intent to
leave riparian rights intact. 2 2 And discussion of riparian rights
indicates that rights of use include consumptive uses. 23 Act 994's
"value-adding" analysis is simply the mechanism by which
existing riparian rights may be extended to a non-riparian, without
the use being considered an unconstitutional donation of the
public's water. Thus, Act 994 does not say that water must be
"value-adding" and thus "merely used" when determining what
constitutes a permissible riparian use. To the contrary, Act 994
implies that some riparian rights of use include uses that consume
water. Act 994 qualifies that a riparian may assign to a nonriparian access rights e ual to his own "for any agricultural or
aquacultural purpose."' 2 If riparian rights of use encompassed
only value-adding, non-consumptive agricultural or aquacultural

habitat to sustain life of living organisms that are customarily or actually
intended to be brought to market for sale." Id.
121. Id. at 3534.
122. Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315, 3316.
123. See supra Part III.B.I.
124. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3535.
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uses, then the Act would simply provide that a riparian may assign
to a non-riparian "access rights equal to his own."
c. A Leak in the Vessel: Why Act 994's Intent to Subject
Frackingto Regulation by CooperativeEndeavor Agreements
is Insufficient
Act 994 exempts agricultural use of water from Act 955's
requirement of cooperative endeavor agreements.1 25 By expressly
stating that riparians may extend their rights of use to non-riparians
for agriculture, Act 994 implies that riparians may not extend their
rights of use to non-riparians for any other purpose. Act 994
carefully explains why non-riparian agricultural use of water is not
a donation, 6 implying that other non-riparian uses of water would
be unconstitutional donations. Acts 955 and 994 in concert clearly
intend for non-riparian fracking to be subject to cooperative
endeavor agreements,127 but neither Act explicitly states it. Act
994 states that a riparian may grant waterway access, with
attendant rights of water use, to a non-riparian agrarian, and that
such use is beneficial and not consumptive. This provision is a
limited statement of riparian rights of use, not a complete
statement. It is an implication that riparians cannot extend rights of
use for fracking to non-riparians, but it is not express policy. The
implication alone may not be sufficient to curtail the ability of a
riparian to extend his or her rights of use to a non-riparian for
fracking. Because Act 955 states that the legislation "shall have no
effect on ... any rights held by riparian owners in accordance with
the laws of this state," Act 994's insinuations are insufficient to
overcome law to the contrary, if such law exists. Thus, the inquiry
is still two-fold: whether fracking is a riparian right, and if so,
whether the right may be conveyed to a non-riparian.
d. Standardsfor Permissible Withdrawal: MaterialInjury and
EnvironmentalBalancing
Whether fracking is a riparian right depends in part on how
much water may be taken under the riparian right of use. Act 994
provides that, for agricultural purposes, there is essentially a
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3534.
127. Act 955 was intended to regulate the fracking activities of oil and gas
companies. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, LA. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., Act 955-Surface
Water Resources Management, Sept. 2010, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?
md-pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=92 (select "Overview Presentation, Sept.
2010").
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duplication of the riparian right of use.1 28 A riparian must already
have a right in order to grant that right to another.129 Act 994
allows a non-riparian to withdraw water for agriculture, pursuant to
a riparian's authorization. The riparian assigns rights "equal to his
own"-so the riparian right must include the right to such water
use in the first place. The only limitation to this duplication of the
riparian right is the Natural Resource Article's commitment to
protect the environment.1 30 Act 994, by allowing a riparian to
assign rights "equal to his own" for agricultural purposes,
equivocally acknowledges that riparian rights include use of water
for agriculture, which entails use of significant quantities of water.
The standard for permissible withdrawal is still unknown, although
it seems that two possibilities exist: the permissibility of water
taken may be evaluated under a material injury standard, or an
environmental balancing test.
Louisiana allows water to be used in a way that removes the
water from the water body.131 No reported Louisiana case has
explicitly addressed the question of how much water can be
withdrawn "before the person taking it exhausted the riparian right,
or activated the riparian right of another .to prevent
withdrawals."' 3 2 The material injury standard built into reasonable
use has apparently governed similar inquiries in the past.' 33
128. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534.
129. For close to 200 years, Louisiana has recognized the principle of nemo dat
quod habet-thatno one can transfer a greater right than he himself has. See Davis
v. Prevost's Heirs, 1 Mart. (n.s.) 650, 675 (La. 1823); see also Modeliste v.
Sehorn, 2008 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 765, *8 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2008) (Louisiana
Civil Code article 2452 expresses the principle of nemo dat quod habet).
130. Act No. 994 § 1(B), 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3535 ("A riparian owner may
assign access rights equal to his own for the surface water adjacent to his
riparian land for any agricultural or aquacultural purpose within the state of
Louisiana by the non-riparian owner without restriction as to the form of any
such agreement to another, provided that the withdrawal of running surface
waters is environmentally and ecologically sound and is consistent with the
required balancing of environmental and ecological impacts with the economic
and social benefits found in Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution of
Louisiana. No riparian owner shall authorize the withdrawal of running waters
for non-riparian use where the use of the water would significantly adversely
impact the sustainability of the water body, or have undue impacts on
navigation, public drinking water supplies, stream or water flow energy,
sediment load and distribution, and on the environment and ecology balanced
against the social and economic benefits of a contract of sale or withdrawal, or
sale of agreement, or right to withdraw running surface water for agricultural
and aquacultural purposes.").
131. Cf Klebba, supra note 50, at 1800.
132. Id.
133. See Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1925), discussed
infra.
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In Jackson v. Walton, the Second Circuit reversed an injunction
against a non-riparian defendant.134 The defendant was removing
water from a bayou pursuant to a contract with a riparian
landowner across the bayou from the plaintiff s land.135 Finding for
the defendant, the court "seems to have assumed that the plaintiff
had something that could be identified as a riparian right to prevent
withdrawals from the stream by a non-riparian if these were shown
to interfere with the riparian's actual uses of the water." 36 Jackson
is significant because it suggests the material injury standard
applies not only to disputes between riparians, but also to disputes
between riparians and non-riparians.
Although the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code did not
make provisions for non-riparian use, the omission did not equate
to a prohibition of non-riparian use.1 37 If a non-riparian may
withdraw water as long as other riparians are not injured, then a
fortioria riparian can do so as well.
If courts decline to apply this material injury standard, Act 994
suggests another standard for evaluating the measure of
permissible riparian water use. Act 994 adopts the Natural
Resources Article's balancing test of environmental impact
weighed against economic and social benefits to assess the
permissibility of a non-riparian's proposed agricultural use. 1if
courts apply Act 994's balancing test outside of its agricultural
context to mediate disputes concerning a riparian's use of water for
fracking, the result would probably be the same as a result reached
by a court applying the material injury standard.
The Natural Resources Article's balancing test is not very
rigorous.139 In fact, such a test may yield even more favorable
results for the contested use than would the material injury
standard. If a use survives the Natural Resources Article's
balancing test, Act 994 requires only that, when a riparian
authorizes a non-riparian use, that use must not "significantly
134. Id.
135. Id. The defendant was pumping water from the bayou to irrigate his
land, which, although adjacent to the land of the riparian with whom he
contracted, was not adjacent to the bayou. Id.
136. Klebba, supra note 50, at 1800.
137. Jones, supranote 64, at 506.
138. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3535. Riparians may grant their water
rights to non-riparians for agriculture without restriction as to form, "provided
that the withdrawal of running surface waters is . . . consistent with the required

balancing of environmental and ecological impacts with the economic and social
benefits found in Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution of Louisiana." Id.
139. The Article provides simply that state natural resources "shall be
protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the
health, safety, and welfare of the people." LA. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
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adverse1 impact" the water's sustainability, flow energy, et
cetera.' 4 The focus is not on whether other riparians are injured by
a use; rather, the use must not "significantly adversely impact" the
environment. A use that affects the water's sustainability and other
attributes may indeed materially injure another riparian, so some
protection of riparians flows from Act 994's commitment to the
environment. But concern for riparians is not a motivating factor.
Meanwhile, under the material injury standard, once a riparian
demonstrates that another's use of water materially injures him or
her, the injurious use immediately becomes unreasonable.141
Conversely, Act 994 could still allow a court to find that such an
injurious use is permissible, as long as the use is otherwise socially
or economically beneficial enough to "balance out" the harm
caused to other riparians. Like the courts of its sister riparian
jurisdictions, the Louisiana Supreme Court has explicitly held that
some polluting uses are reasonable.14 2 Even if the evaluation shifts
from material injury to Natural Resources balancing, the result
should be the same. The reasonable use doctrine will likely not
prevent fracking solely on the grounds of its being a consumptive
and polluting use. 143 It is reasonable to conclude that the use of
water for fracking is a permissible riparian right of use.
C.Are RiparianRights Limited to Riparians?
If the analysis ended here, fracking would be considered a
reasonable riparian use, even though the use consumes large
amounts of water, and even if the use ultimately pollutes the
watercourse. However, Act 955 was not prompted by concern about
140. Id.
141. See Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848), for an illustration of this
longstanding principle.
142. See Long v. La. Creosoting Co., 69 So. 281 (La. 1915). Louisiana's
preference for agricultural use of water implicitly condones polluting uses of
water; Louisiana Civil Code article 657 permits a riparian to use water for
irrigation. In fact, Act 955 ranks agricultural use of water just beneath domestic
use in its hierarchy of preferred uses, and Act 994 considers agricultural use to
be so beneficial that it allows water to be taken for agricultural purposes without
being considered a "donation." Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315, 3317; Act No.
994, 2010 La. Acts 3534. Yet, agricultural use indisputably causes harm to the
environment. See e.g., U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL
WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGREss, 2002 REPORTING CYCLE
10 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/ (the top sources of river
and stream pollution include agricultural activities such as crop production,
grazing, and animal feeding operations).
143. See Part III.B.1 and III.B.2 (reasonable use includes consumptive and
polluting uses).
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riparian landowners personally removing water for fracking on their
own estates. The legslation targets the activities of non-riparian oil
and gas companies, so the analysis must continue.
Assuming the riparian right of reasonable use includes the use of
running water for fracking, to whom is the right available? "The
riparian" is the obvious answer, but it may not be the only answer.
If, as jurisprudence suggests, the riparian has a vested property right
to reasonably withdraw water, may he or she convey that n ht to
another without a conveyance of the actual riparian property?'
Resolving this question is crucial for the efficacy of Act 955. If
the riparian right of use also includes the prerogative to convey that
right, or to constructively duplicate that right by granting access to
the water (as Act 994 allows for agriculture), oil and gas lessees
could circumvent the authority of the Department of Natural
Resources by dealing directly with riparians.1 6 Act 955 cannot be
amended to prevent this scenario without addressing whether the
power to convey riparian rights of use is, in fact, a vested property
right.
Jurisdictions that eschew the riparian scheme, following what is
known as the "prior appropriation" doctrine, recognize the right to
convey water rights separate from an estate. Prior appropriation
jurisdictions regard the right to use water as "a real property right,
which, although appurtenant to land, may be separately
conveyed." 47 Under riparian doctrine, however, "riparian rights are
an inherent aspect of upland ownership and are not severable from
it." 14 8 It was well-established long before Kent's Commentaries that
144. La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0176 (2010); OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, LA.
DEP'T OF NAT. RES., Act 95S-Surface Water Resources Management, Sept.
2010, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfin?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=92
(select "Overview Presentation,Sept. 2010").
145. The question is whether the riparian right of use is a right that may be
severed from the rest of the riparian's property. See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND
GAS LAW INA NUTSHELL 39 (5th ed. 2009) ("It is axiomatic in Anglo-American
law that an owner of property rights can transfer property rights in whole or in
part. Where an owner transfers less than the whole bundle of property rights he
or she owns, we say that rights have been 'severed."').
146. If an oil company is itself a riparian landowner, and the riparian right to
use water includes fracking-destined withdrawal, such a company may continue
using running surface water for fracking on an unregulated basis. Part III.A and
III.B suggest that fracking is a permissible riparian use of water. If an oil and
gas company becomes a riparian, it too would presumptively be able to use
water for fracking on its own riparian land.
147. Walther, supra note 47; see e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11 (Westlaw
2010).
148. Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla.
1985) (expressing the general principle, though later deviating from it); see also
Seneca Consol. Gold Mines Co. v. Great Western Power Co., 287 P. 93, 98 (Cal.
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a riparian, though having no property right in the water itself, enjoys
a usufruct in running water by virtue of his proximity to the
water.149 The riparian right exists because of the riparian's
adjacency to water, so that right cannot be severed from the property
that is the source of the right.150 However, the practice of riparian
states has been inconsistent with doctrine. Many state supreme
courts in riparian jurisdictions have held that, in at least some
instances, certain riparian rights ma 5indeed be conveyed separately
from ownership of the riparian land. 'On the other hand, Louisiana
may find guidance more aligned with riparian doctrine in its French
civilian heritage. French law affirmed the doctrinal principle that
riparian rights are inseparable from ownership of the land: "The
quality of being riparian does not transfer itself by means of the
agreement to those who do not possess anything along the rivers,
hence the rights attached to the quality of being riparian are equally
non-transferable to others." 52
1930) ("[T]he riparian right is in its nature a tenancy in common and not a
separate or severable estate.").
149. KENT, supra note 80, at 439; see also Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93
N.W. 781, 790 (Neb. 1903) ("The law does not recognize a riparian property
right in the corpus of the water. The riparian proprietor does not own the water.
He has the right only to enjoy the advantage of a reasonable use of the stream as
it flows by his land, subject to a like right belonging to all other riparian
proprietors." (citations omitted)).
150. See Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 89 P. 338 (Cal.
1907); McCord v. The Big Brothers Movement, Inc., 185 A. 480 (N.J. Ch.
1936) (suggesting that water taken under the riparian rights doctrine may not be
used for the benefit of non-riparians).
151. See e.g., Burwell's Bay Improvement Ass'n v. Scott, 672 S.E.2d 847,
849 (Va. 2009) ("The law in Virginia is clear, as both parties agree, that riparian
rights are severable from the property to which the rights were originally
appurtenant."); Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., Div. of Admin., 476
So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1985) ("[R]iparian rights may sometimes be severed from
the ownership of the land to which they attach. .. . There is nothing novel about
the notion of finding a legal separateness of an incorporeal interest such as a
riparian right. The law has long recognized the separateness of nonpossessory
property interests, including incorporeal heriditaments and future interests.");
Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 176 (Wis. 1965) ("The cases, however, are
in accord that the riparian rights and title to the land under the water are
severable if the deed makes that limitation clear."); Hanford v. St. Paul &
Duluth R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 104, 119-20 (Minn. 1889) ("The rights of no one are
affected by allowing the riparian owner to convey away this part of his property
as he may his other property. It is only an abstract question whether the right,
originating in custom, and having originally attached as an incident to his
riparian lands, may now be sold and conveyed, and be enjoyed by the purchaser.
... No one is interested in opposing such unrestricted alienability and use.").
152. 7 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 356 (2d ed. 1876)
(quoted in Samuel C. Wiel, Origin and ComparativeDevelopment in the Law of
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Whether the right to use water can be transferred absent a
conveyance of riparian rights in Louisiana is still "an open issue."' 5 3
The Jackson court did not invalidate a contract granting a nonriparian access to the waterway absent actual harm to other
riparians. 154 Although the non-riparian used his access to remove
water, the court did not discuss the validity of the contract. 15 In fact,
it appears that Louisiana courts have never directly addressed
whether riparian rights may be transferred separately from the full
ownership of riparian land. 5 6
The nature of Louisiana water rights, however, may hold the
answer to the question. The Civil Code articles on riparian rights are
located under the chapter of natural servitudes, suggesting, pro
subjecta materia, that riparian rights are governed by the law of
servitudes.' 5 7 A natural servitude arises from the natural situation of
estates.' 5 8 The riparian water rights servitude is a natural servitude,
because it arises from the riparian estate's contiguity to a
watercourse. 159 A landowner cannot convey a natural servitude
separately from the land to which it is attached.16 0 Therefore, even if
other jurisdictions construe riparian rights to allow water rights to be
conveyed separately from the land, such a construction does not
apply in Louisiana.
Although riparians may not sever their rights of use from their
riparian estates, it is less clear whether riparians may duplicate those
rights by assigning their rights of use to non-riparians, as
contemplated by Act 994. Pursuant to Act 994, in agricultural
situations, Louisiana deviates from the general riparian principle that
the "formality of owning a square foot of riparian land limits the
right to use water on non-riparian land to people who are riparian
landowners."162 Act 994 moots the issue of "severance" because it

Watercourses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CAL. L. REv. 342,
367 (1918)).
153. La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0176 (2010).
154. Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1925).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 655 (2009) (creating a servitude in favor of the
upstream estate).
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 654 (2010).
159. See Doiron v. O'Bryan, 51 So. 2d 628 (La. 1951).
160. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 652-54 (2009). "[S]ervitudes are non-transferable
separate and apart from the dominant estate. Thus the only transfers of the right
of water usage permitted are those accomplished by a transfer of the title in the
riparian estate." Jones, supra note 64, at 507.
161. Walther, supra note 47, at 563-64.
162. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 55.
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allows a riparian to assign a right equal to his or her own to a nonriparian seeking water for agricultural pursuits. 163 Thus, if a riparian
can lease or sell water rights to a non-riparian and still retain his or
her own rights in the property, the riparian right is not truly
"severed" from the land, and inheres with the riparian landowner. In
Act 994, a sale does not sever the riparian right; rather, assignment
seems to duplicate the riparian right. 164 In any event, Act 994 only
addresses non-riparian agricultural use. The Act does not
encompass the permissibility of granting access or withdrawal
privileges, or both, to non-riparians for industrial purposes like
fracking.
Long before Act 994's enactment, limited jurisprudence has
suggested that riparians have the ability to grant non-riparians the
general right to withdraw water. In Keeley v. Schexnailder, the
Louisiana Third Circuit upheld a riparian landowner's grant of
access to water to a non-riparian. 16 The court did not address
whether it would uphold a grant of the right to withdraw water. 66in
Jackson v. Walton, however, the court's refusal to invalidate the
riparian's grant of access to a non-riparian necessarily confirmed the
non-riparian's continued withdrawal of surface water.16 7
Of course, no matter how one construes prior jurisprudence, it is
well-settled in Louisiana law that one cannot grant greater rights to a
thing than one owns.1 68 Thus, at most, a grant of the right to
withdraw water cannot exceed the riparian's own right to withdraw.
If the legislature or the courts determine that a riparian owner does
not have a vested property right in withdrawing water for fracking,
then a riparian could not grant such a right of use to oil and gas
lessees. Presently, although one could construe the vagaries of Acts
955 and 994 to include this limitation, the legislature has made no
such determination.
Despite the laws of other riparian states, an amalgamation of
Louisiana water law supports the contention that riparians may not
convey their rights of use to non-riparians. Acts 955 and 994 in
conjunction with Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1101 and
Louisiana Constitution article 7, section 14, form a picture of water
rights that can be summarized as follows: Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:1101 declares that the waters of all waterbodies in
the state are "property of the state."1 69 Water belongs to the State in
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3535.
Id. at § 1(B).
708 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1998).
Id. at 843; La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0176 (2010).
Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1925).
See supra note 129.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008).
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its capacity as a public person.' 7 0 The State owns the water, and that
ownership is exclusive, except to the extent the State permits others
to have a share in the use of the water. Any non-riparian who wishes
to use water by withdrawing it from a water body must do so
pursuant to a cooperative endeavor agreement, by paying the State
for the water withdrawn.171 However, riparians may withdraw water
free of charge by virtue of their rights of reasonable use.172 Because
the riparian has a right to withdraw water for his own reasonable
use, that use is not a donation and is exempt from Act 955's
cooperative endeavor agreement requirement. A riparian also has
the right to extend his right of use to a non-riparian and to nonriparian land if the water is used for agricultural purposes.' 7 3
However, Act 994 implies that when non-riparians take water for
their own non-agricultural use, it is the impermissible taking of a
public thing.' 74 Although a riparian owner has special rights to use
water, a public thing, he has no right to try to sell a public thing.
Riparian owners cannot sell property that belongs to the State.
Granting a lease of access to the water effectively "sells" water,
since it allows the lessee to take away state-owned water. The Civil
Code allows riparians to use water for the benefit of their own
riparian land; it does not grant riparians an economic interest in the
water itself, to be used, leased, or sold as the riparian pleases.
D. GeographicalScope of the RiparianRight
Even if a riparian landowner did have the right to sell or lease
his own right of use to a non-riparian for non-agricultural purposes,
that right would probably not extend to non-riparian land. Unless a
natural gas well is located on riparian property, there is the
additional issue of how far the riparian right to withdraw water
extends geographically. Most riparian states limit rights of use to
riparian lands. 5 Because riparian jurisdictions find that rights
attach only to a riparian's land within the watershed, most consider
use outside the watershed of origin to be per se unreasonable. 176
Many jurisdictions, however, will not prevent the use unless another
170. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2009).
171. Act No. 955, 2010 La. Acts 3315, § 1.
172. LA. CIV. CODE art. 657 (2009).
173. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534, 3535.
174. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius: Act 994 states that agricultural and
aquacultural uses of water are not consumptive. Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts
3534. By implication, any other use of water is consumptive and is therefore a
"donation" to non-riparians if they do not purchase the water from the State.
175. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 53.
176. Id. at 31.
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riparian is actually injured.' 7 7 Depending on a number of
circumstances, the "best economic use of water may be for
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, or other purposes on land apart
from the waterbody."' 78 There may be strong policy reasons to
determine that a riparian right of use on non-riparian land is within
the ambit of riparian rights, so long as that use does not harm other
riparians. Indeed, "[r]easonable use jurisdictions now generally
require proof of actual harm from a riparian's use of water on nonriparian land within the watershed."' 7 9
Even if other reasonable use jurisdictions require proof of harm
before a riparian may enjoin another riparian's use of water on nonriparian land, Louisiana law interprets the right more narrowly.
First, Civil Code article 658 provides that although a riparian owner
may make use of the water running over his lands, he "cannot stop it
or give it another direction and is bound to return it to its ordinary
channel where it leaves his estate." 8 0 Fracking shoots water
thousands of feet underground. One may argue such use gives the
water "another direction," which the Code specifically excludes
from the ambit of riparian rights. A more logical interpretation is
that the article refers to a situation in which the riparian would
change the direction of the watercourse itself, since any "use" of
water necessarily changes the direction of the appropriated water
from the stream to the kitchen, garden, or sugar cane crop.
Second, Act 994 implies that riparian rights of use do not
normally extend beyond riparian land. Act 994 makes several
statements of legislative policy applicable to the general discussion
of riparian rights. Most importantly, water used for agricultural
purposes is not a prohibited donation.' 8 Because this specified
agricultural use of water is not a donation, a riparian may assign
rights of use equal to his own to a non-riparian.1 82 When a nonriparian uses water for agricultural purposes on non-riparian land
the legislature explains he has not "consumed" the state's water.18J
The non-riparian need only use the water for agricultural purposes
somewhere "within the state." 1 84 Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius:
when a non-riparian uses water for other purposes, it is consumption
of a public thing; it is a donation unless conducted pursuant to an
Act 955 cooperative endeavor agreement. Act 994 suggests that use
177. Id.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id at 55.
Id. at 53.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 658 (2009).
Act No. 994, 2010 La. Acts 3534.
Id. at § 1(B).
Id. at § 1(A).
Id. at § 1(B).
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of water on non-riparian land for purposes other than agriculture
consumes water. Consequently, when the State permits such use, it
effectively "donates" the water to the user. Because Louisiana's
constitution forbids such donations, a riparian "right" at odds with
the constitution cannot exist.'8 5 Thus, the right of riparian use does
not extend to non-riparian land except when used for agriculture.
IV. CONCLUSION

Act 955 purports not to affect riparian rights as recognized by
the laws of this state. To determine precisely what Act 955 does do,
the legislature must clarify the meaning of "the laws of this state."
Act 994 protects the agricultural industry from the requirement of
cooperative endeavor agreements, but it does not, by implication,
subject fracking initiated or allowed by a riparian to such
agreements. The weight of riparian rights jurisprudence suggests
that water withdrawn for fracking is a reasonable riparian use,
logically within the rights that Act 955 purports to leave untouched.
Louisiana's current water law suggests riparians may not lease or
sell their rights of use, effectively selling public property-but this
suggestion may be insufficient to support the policy intended by Act
955. Unless and until Act 955 clearly enunciates that riparian rights
do not include the right to lease or otherwise grant access to water
for fracking, it may be powerless to regulate the fracking activities
of oil and gas companies using the shield of riparianism to engage in
unregulated withdrawal of surface water. If the legislature intends to
remove non-riparian fracking from the ambit of protected riparian
water use, then, in the interest of clarity and predictability, it should
specifically provide that there is no "right" to convey that particular
riparian right of use recognized by the laws of this State.
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